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Abstract. The Grid technology concerns the sharing of resources among
a very large set of users. One of the main security issues of the Grid en-
vironment concerns the user authorization. As a matter of fact, Grid
resource providers grant accesses to their resources to unknown users,
but they wants that these accesses are regulated by proper security poli-
cies.
This paper proposes a framework that integrates an advanced authoriza-
tion system in the globus toolkit. This framework is based on the RTML
Framework. For each Grid user that requests to access the Grid resource,
the framework determines the proper set of rights to be paired to the
user by exploiting the set of credential submitted by the user itself.
1 Introduction
Due to the dynamic, collaborative and distributed nature of the Grid, security is
a fundamental issue in this environment. As a matter of fact, the resource sharing
implemented by the Grid environment must be highly controlled, because Grid
service providers, that would grant access to their resources to known as well as
unknown users, want these accesses to be regulated by a security policy stating
which actions can be performed on the resources.
Security management in the Grid environment is complicated by the need
to establish secure relationships between a large number of dynamically created
participants among which no trust relationships exist a priori, and across distinct
administrative domains, each with its distinct resources and its own local security
policy. In the case of computational resources, for instance, Grid service providers
allow the execution of unknown applications on behalf of unknown Grid users on
their resources. If an adequate security support is not adopted, the applications
could perform dangerous and even malicious actions on these resources.
Among the functionality of Grid Security Support, the authorization is a fun-
damental one. As a matter of fact, since Grid Service Providers need to authorize
? Work partially supported by CNR project “Trusted e-services for dynamic coali-
tions”, EU-funded “SENSORIA”, ”S3MS” and “GRIDTrust”.
also unknown users, a proper support is required. To this purpose, this paper
proposes a flexible and powerful instrument for service and resource manage-
ment which enables each site to dinamically evaluate user’s requests exploiting
his credentials. In this approach authorization is not based on the user’s Grid
identity but on the trust he has obtained performing jobs on different sites, trust
which is expressed in form of credentials. As a matter of fact, the identity of a
Grid user is verified in the standard way. However, since the Grid user could be
unknown to a service provider, this identity is not paired with a set of right.
2 Related Work
The security requirements of the Grid environment are detailed in [6], [7] and
[13]. These requirements include authentication, delegation, authorization, pri-
vacy, message confidentiality and integrity, trust, policy and access control en-
forcement. However, these requirements are not fully implemented by the current
Grid environments.
Most of the approaches that have been proposed to improve the security of
the Grid environment are related to Globus, that is one of the most used Grid
toolkit. These approaches are meant to integrate in the Globus architecture an
authorization system that performs a fine grained access control on Grid re-
sources. The Globus Security Infrastructure, GSI, assigns a unique Grid identity
to each VO participant. This identity is represented by a X.509 certificate signed
by the VO certification authority, that includes the owner identity string and its
public key. This certificate is used by the owner to produce proxy certificates,
to authenticate himself on some services. Once the authentication is successfully
performed, the Grid participant is mapped into a local user with the proper set
of right. The strength of this mechanism is given by the secrecy of the private key
that, in turn, mainly depends upon the owner local security policy. If the work-
station of a VO participant p is violated and the private key of p is stolen, the
attacker can impersonate p on the Grid, and can execute malicious applications
on the Grid services provided by other participants.
Moreover, Globus provides a coarse grained access control on the resource,
because once the Globus Resource Allocation Manager [4] has authenticated
a Grid user through the identity certificate, this user is mapped onto a local
account, and the security policy that is enforced is only the one defined by the
privileges paired with the local account by the resource operating system.
The Community Authorization Service, CAS, has been proposed by the
Globus team in [5] and [14]. It is an implementation of an authorization ser-
vice integrated with the Globus toolkit. CAS is a service that stores a database
of VO policies, i.e. the policies that determines what each Grid user is allowed
to do as VO member. This service issues to Grid users proxy certificates that
embed CAS policy assertions. The Grid user that wants to use a Grid resource
contacts the CAS service to request a proper credential to request a service on
this resource. The credential returned by the CAS server will be presented by
the Grid user to the service it wants to exploit. In this way sites are enabled to
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apply their local policy to the VO on behalf of which the user is requesting the
job and the policy of the VO for that user to his job. This approach requires
CAS-enabled services, i.e. services that are able to understand and enforce the
policies included in the credentials released by the CAS server. Moreover, users
can only enjoy trust granted from their membership to a specific VO which is
independent from his behaviour on the other sites.
An approach that integrates a fine grain authorization system in the Grid
environment has been proposed by Keahey and Welch. In [8], they describe some
of the shortcomings of the current Globus authorization system and they state
the need for a fine grain authorization system. In [17], they address this issue
by integrating Akenti within the Globus toolkit. “Akenti is an authorization
service (PDP) that uses authenticated X.509 certificates to establish identity
and distributed digitally signed authorization policy certificates to make access
decisions about distributed resources” [18]. Once the user has been authenticated
on the base of his Grid identity and the site grid-mapfile, the JobManager finds
the policies for each resource referred in the job request and matches them with
all the user credentials in order to evaluate the request. This solution is a pure
pull model in which all the user capabilities are taken on after his authentication.
Another solution to adopt an advanced authorization system in the Grid
environment has been presented by Stell, Sinnot and Watt in [16]. They integrate
a role based access control infrastructure, PERMIS, with the Globus toolkit to
provide fine grained control on user rights. PERMIS is “a a role based access
control infrastructure that uses X.509 certificates to store users’ role. All access
control decisions are driven by an authorization policy, which is itself stored in a
X.509 attribute certificate..” [2]. PERMIS supports classical hierarchical RBAC,
in which roles are allocated to users and privileges to roles. Its limit depends on
the weakness of role’s relationships in which senior roles inherit privileges from
junior roles, they are not always satisfactory to express policies. Moreover it has
the same restriction of Akenti, it is impossible for a user to request a subset of
the permissions paired to a role .
Other solutions to provide an authorization system in the Grid environment
has been proposed, such as VOMS [1]. In VOMS a VO have a hierarchical struc-
ture with groups and subgroups; a user in a VO is characterized by a set of
attribute, 3-tuples of the form group, role, capability. The combined values of
all these 3-tuples form a unique attribute, the Fully Qualified Attribute Name
(FQAN). A user contacts one or more VOMS server in order to obtain the
authorization informations granted by a VO to him. To access a resource the
user creates the proxy certificate containing into an extension all the informa-
tion received from the VOMS Servers and send it to the Gatekeeper. To make
the authorization decision these informations needs to be extracted from the
user’s proxy and combined with the local policy which respects the agreements
between the VO and the Service Provider. The Resource Provider periodically
queries VOMS databases to generate a list of VO users and map them to local
account.
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The first condition for a user to access the Grid in CAS and VOMS, is to be
a member of a VO and this restriction collides with our aim to have an open
system in which the requests are not evaluated on the basis of the user identity.
Furthermore in CAS there is a small flexibility; those services that are not CAS-
enabled cannot determine the identity of the user cause the proxy certificate has
the CAS server’s DN as the subject. Permis and Akenty are open environments
in which the credentials are evaluated instead of the user identity. While Akenty
does not support the concept of role, Permis adopts a hierarchic RBAC. But it
has a too weak enforcement engine to express access policies in the best way.
3 RTML: Role-based Trust Management
RT framework is a family of Role-Based Trust-Management languages suitable
to represent policies and credentials and useful in implementing mechanism of
authorization and access control in distributed environments (e.g., see [11, 19,
10, 9]). In these languages, credentials carry information on policies to define
attributes of the owners, also denoted as principals, by starting from assertions
of other principals, in general they define membership to a role and they can
delegate authority to add further members to it.
The notion of attribute is general enough to permit to use RT languages
to model Role-based Access Control Mechanisms (RBAC), e.g. see [15]. As a
matter of fact, an attribute could be considered as a role. Then one could use
RT credential to express how principals are related to roles1. In this sense the
concept of role in RT is more generic then the one in RBAC, roles in RT collect
principals and they could be parametric. Taking into account that credential
chains delegate permissions to access resources, all the involved principals need
to specify resources and grant conditions with a thick terminology. If different
issuers adopt incompatible schemes their credentials couldn’t be combined. In
this paper principals are denoted with A,B,C...; roles with a principal followed
by a role’s name. For example A.r could be read ’the role r of A’, only A has
the authority to define A.r’s members and this is done by issuing credentials of
role definition.
Each credential represents the membership to a certain role both of a prin-
cipal and of another role, or of an expression which involves other roles or prin-
cipals. In RBAC the name of a role is generally an atomic string and sometimes
this is too much restrictive. As a matter of fact in distinct situations could be
desiderable to use the same role to grant distinct permissions but with a few
differences among them. For this reason the concept of parametric role has been
introduced, it is represented as a tuple of data associated to the name of the role
e.g. A.role(r1, ..., ri), and it could represent:
– Entity relationships
e.g. if C company grants to a manager the valuation of an employee; the role
C.managerOf(employeeId) could be used.
1 Similarly, credentials and attributes could be used to assign permissions to roles
4
– Attributes with fields
e.g. a degree could be defined by fields such as: year, final, university, etc.
– Access permissions
Which use parameters to identify resources or access modes.
RTML is a XML-based language representing data useful to implement poli-
cies and credentials in the RT-framework, it uses three type of document:
– ApplicationDomainSpecification
Defines a suite of related data types and role names, called a vocabulary.
The use of a role name needs to refer to the ADSD in which the role name
is declared.
– Credentials
Defines one or more credentials issued by an entity, this document should be
signed by the entity who released these credentials.
– AccessRules
Defines the rules which control the access to a role or group.
In the following we describe these documents.
3.1 Application Domain Specification Document (ADSD)
As previously disclosed, the use of a shared vocabulary constituites a critical
point in those systems which represent the rights as attributes, such as the Grid
environment. The definition of a role is meaningful only if all the parts involved
are allowed to access the role structure and possibly the permissions granted
to it. An ADSD defines a vocabulary which implements this structure using
standard data type or defining new ones, this document has to be public. The
following example shows a simple definition:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<ApplicationDomainSpecification uri="C:\rtml\examples\EPub\ABUADSD.xml"
id="ABUADSD"
xmlns="http://crypto.stanford.edu/dc/RTMLv1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://crypto.stanford.edu/dc/RTMLv1.0
http://crypto.stanford.edu/~ninghui/rtml/RTMLv1.0q.xsd">
<EnumType name="degree">
<EnumValue>B.S.</EnumValue>
<EnumValue>M.S.</EnumValue>
<EnumValue>Ph.D.</EnumValue>
</EnumType>
<RoleDeclaration name="University">
<Plain issuerTraces="all" subjectTraces="none">
<Parameter name="name">
<Type name="string"/>
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</Parameter>
</Plain>
</RoleDeclaration>
<RoleDeclaration name="Student">
<Plain issuerTraces="all" subjectTraces="none">
<Parameter name="university">
<Type name="string"/>
</Parameter>
<Parameter name="department">
<Type name="string"/>
</Parameter>
<Parameter name="program">
<Type name="degree"/>
</Parameter>
<Parameter name="id">
<Type name="string"/>
</Parameter>
<Parameter name="name">
<Type name="person name"/>
</Parameter>
</Plain>
</RoleDeclaration>
</ApplicationDomainSpecification>
This document defines the structure of the roles University and Student.
3.2 Credential documents
In a ”trust-management” approach, a requester sends a request to an authorizer
who specifies an access-policy, expressed as a set of access rules, which govern the
accesses to protect resources. The requester adds a set of credentials to the re-
quest and the authorizer decides whether to authorize this request by answering
the question:”Do the access rules and credentials authorize the request?”.
Credential and AccessRules have the same structure; they define one or more
rule contained into a root-element called CredentialStore tag:
<CredentialStore >
<Credential id=’#1’>. . .</Credential>
. . .
<Credential id=’#n’>. . .</Credential>
</CredentialStore>
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Each rule definition is compound of three elements.
1. Prologue
It contains all the informations used afterwards in the document, it counts a
DefaultDomain and zero or more ImportDomain which refers all the ADSDs
necessary to recover the structure of all the roles involved, one or more Prin-
cipal containing the public key of the entities in the credential and a Issuer
that points to the Principal who issued the role, it could be an IntegerValue
or a StringValue but it has to be a KeyValue as defined in the XML Segna-
ture Standard to offer guarantee of security. Below it is showed an example:
<Preamble>
<DefaultDomain uri=".../path/to/adsd_document.xml"/>
<Principal shortName="K_StateU">
<StringValue>l2BQjxUjC8yykrmCouuEC/BYHPU...</StringValue>
</Principal>
<Principal shortName="K_Bob">
<StringValue>0o4KOuHiuzpnWRbqN/C/ohN...</StringValue>
</Principal>
</Preamble>
<Issuer>
<PrincipalRef shortName="K_StateU"/>
</Issuer>
2. Credential
RTML defines a set of Credential/AccessRule definition, each containing a
HeadRoleTerm and a body. Different kinds of definitions contain different
elements as the body part. We adopt an abstract syntax in describing these
definitions; r represents the HeadRoleTerm, r1 and r2 represents other role
terms, we assume A as the credential issuer while B and D represent generic
issuers.
– Simple Member A.r(p =′ value′)← D
The credential issuer is A and the role membership includes the D prin-
cipal. In general a Simple Member represents a certification about which
roles has been acquired by a user, it is signed by the entity who released
this roles. The body part is a Principal identifier.
<SimpleMember>
<HeadRoleTerm name="r">
<Parameter name="p">
<StringValue>’value’</StringValue>
</Parameter>
</HeadRoleTerm>
<PrincipalRef shortName="D"/>
</SimpleMember>
– Simple Containment A.r ← B.r1
An ExternalRole is the body part of the credential. A defines that the
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role membership includes all entities included in the external r1 role
issued by the B principal. The dimension of A.r should be no less than
that of B.r1.
<SimpleContainment>
<HeadRoleTerm name="r"/>
<ExternalRole>
<PrincipalRef shortName="B"/>
<RoleTerm name=r1/>
</ExternalRole>
</SimpleContainment>
– Linked Containment A.r ← A.r1.r2
The body part consists of a LinkedRole element, which contains two
RoleTerm elements. The dimension of A.r The credential issuer is A and
the role membership includes all entities from the external r2 role issued
by the P principal where P is a member of r1 of the default principal A.
The dimension of A.r shoul be no less than that of P.r2
<LinkedContainment>
<HeadRoleTerm name="r"/>
<LinkedRole>
<RoleTerm name=r1/>
<RoleTerm name=r2/>
</LinkedRole>
</LinkedContainment>
– Intersection Containment A.r ← A.r1 ∩B.r2
The body part consists of an Intersection element, which contains two or
more roles; an ExternalRole if the referred role is issued by an external
entity or a RoleTerm element if it is issued by A itself. The role mem-
bership includes all entities which are simultaneously members from the
internal r1 role and the external r2 role issued by the B principal.
<IntersectionContainment>
<HeadRoleTerm name="r"/>
<Intersetion>
<ExternalRole>
<PrincipalRef shortName="B"/>
<RoleTerm name=r2>
</ExternalRole>
<RoleTerm name=r1>
</Intersection>
</IntersectionContainment>
The following two definitions can be express using the previous rules:
– Simple Delegation A.r ⇐ B[: r2]
The credential issuer is A who delegates its authority over r to B, in
other words, A trusts B’s judgement on assigning members to r. When
r2 is present it works as a sort of control; B can only assign members
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of A.r2 to A.r. A Simple Delegation could be expressed using a Simple
Containment and an Intersection Containment: A.r ← B.r ∩A.r2
<SimpleDelegation>
<HeadRoleTerm name="r"/>
<DelegateTo>
<PrincipalRef shortName="B"/>
</DelegateTo>
<Control>
<RoleTerm name=r2>
</Control>
</SimpleDelegation>
– Advanced Delegation A.r ⇐ r1[: B.r2]
The credential issuer is A who delegates its authority over r to members
of A.r1. When B.r2 is present it works as a sort of control; each member
of A.r1 can only assign members of B.r2 to A.r. In other words an
Advanced Delegation could be expressed using a Linked Containment
and an Intersection Containment: A.r ← A.r.r1 ∩B.r2
<AdvancedDelegation>
<HeadRoleTerm name="r"/>
<DelegateTo>
<RoleTerm name=r1>
</DelegateTo>
<Control>
<PrincipalRef shortName="B"/>
<RoleTerm name=r_2>
</Control>
</AdvancedDelegation>
3. VerificationData
It contains a ValidityTime element, and an optional signature part consisting
of a Signature element as specified in the XML Signature Standard.
3.3 AccessRule Documents
As already expressed in 3.2, Credential and AccessRule documents have the same
structure. The main difference consists that the Issuer value is not present in
the AccessRule document; it defines a policy and the issuer of these rules is the
policy issuer itself. Furthermore the Signature element is missed too, the issuer
does not need to verify its policy.
4 Globus extended with RTML: RTMLAuthzService
As advancely said in Section 1, because of the very large user community, it is
not trivial to implement a solution where the ”Common Names” of all Grid users
are listed in the GridMap file of every Grid resource. Hence we propose a solution
that provide a fine-grained authorization system that determine the permissions
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to be paired to a Grid user depending on the trust that he collected in his
previous experiences. This trust is represented by the set of certificates owned
by the user. Each entity involved in the authorization process makes available
a set of digitally signed Credential Documents acquired from different domains.
The user authentication is carried out using the Globus Toolkit’s Grid Security
Infrastracture (GSI) as usual. Our purpose is to give to the user the possibility of
asking for a role in order to execute a job with the privileges paired to this role. To
choose the role he needs we assume that the user, before starting this operations,
is allowed to know the roles which are admissible in the site, and for each all the
specific parameters. This could be possible by accessing ADSDs, which are stored
in a public repository. Moreover, users should know, for each role, the related
policy for job execution.In fig.1 is shown the integration of our authorization
system, RTMLAuthzService, with Globus. Ws-Gram is the Globus component
that manages the execution of the application submitted by the remote Grid
user. Our authorization system runs as a globus service and it is pointed in the
’server-config.wssd’ file of all services we want to protect with it. In this way
the authorization mechanism is independent from the globus architecture. The
communication between the Ws-Gram and the RTMLAuthzService makes use
of the Saml protocol as explained in the next section.
4.1 Saml Request/Response
An application gateway is responsible to give or deny access to the resource, it is
compound of two modules: the Access Control Enforcement Function (AEF) and
the Access Control Decision Function (ADF). The SAML protocol, developed
by the OASIS group, is the standard used for invoking authorization decision
requests as expected in the Globus Toolkit. Once the user authentication has
taken place, a SamlRequest is generated by the AEF of the Ws-Gram and is sent
to the ADF of the RTMLAuthzService as showed in fig.1 by the arrow with the
tag 1. This request contains informations about the user, the service requested
and how to reach the credential repositories in the environment. If the access
to the resource is granted, the AEF receives a positive SamlResponse from the
ADF, otherwise it recives a negative SamlResponse (represented by the arrow
with tag 8 in fig.1).
4.2 Policy Decision Point
Once the request has been acquired, the Authorization Service needs to evalu-
ate one or more assertions that grant the holder specif rights on the resources
according with the policies. A Policy Decision Point (PDP) is the component
to do that. We have to consider two different approach for that; the first pro-
poses a push model in which the user can choose the most suitable credentials
to submit. The second approach foresees a pull model in which is the ADF who
obtains the user credentials from the issuer public repositories whose URIs were
passed at initialization time. Even though the first offers a best quality regarding
the user privacy, because a user does not need to show service providers all his
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Fig. 1. The RTMLAuthzService system
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credentials, for a first implementation of the service we choose the pull model
in order to keep unchanged the globus clients. We are working on a revision of
the architecture extended with a push model. Once the ADF has reached all the
user credentials on the net it checks their integrity verifing their signature as
showed by the arrow 2 in fig.1. Access decisions are taken on the base of the
local policy for the domain expressed by the access rules, the credentials owned
by the requestor and what action is being requested on which target. It could be
useful to have a set of roles associated to a service, each with different privileges
on the local system. This could be obtained by mapping each role on a Unix
account.
As better explained in the next section the analysis of the RTML code of
access rules and user credentials produces a set of DATALOG statements. The
enforcement of each role in a set associated to the requested target is done on
these statements by a Prolog engine (see the configuration file in section 5). Con-
sidering that Globus Toolkit needs the use of the GridMapAuthorizationService
for those services which requires the execution of jobs through local users; a new
entry with the user DN is added to the GridMap file associating it with a list
containing all the roles that the statements have enforced, the GridMapAutho-
rizationService is started and a positive SamlResponse is sent (arrow 7 in fig.1).
Otherwise if no role match with the user’s credentials a negative SamlResponse
is sent to the AEF and the access is denied. If the user specifies the role he wants
to use in the JobDescriptionFile and his credentials support it, he can execute
the job with the privileges granted by this role. If no role is specified is given the
first role of the list in his entry. This list is configured by the PDP to grant the
minimum privilege.
4.3 RTML Framework
An RT parser is the element addicted to receive the RTML code from the ADF
and to parse it, its output is a complex data structure, a CredentialStore, which
contains all the information concerning the received credentials and all the site’s
AccessRules in the form of RT statements as explained in 3.2 as showed in
fig.1 at 4 and 5. A second step is done by the RT engine which turns each RT
statement in a DATALOG statement according with the rules and the specific
syntax explained in [20] (6 in fig.1):
– A.r(h1, ...hn)← D becomes r(A,D, x1, ...xn) : −φ
This statement represents a Prolog fact.
– A.r(h1, ...hn)← A1.r1(s1, ...sm) becomes
r(A, Y, x1, ...xn) : −r1(B, Y, y1, ...ym), φ
If the entity Y has the role r1 in B with the parameters y1, ...ym in φ, then
it also has the role r in A with the parameters x1, ...xn.
– A.r(h1, ...hn)← A.r1(s1, ...sm).r2(l1, ...lk) becomes
r(A, Y, x1, ...xn) : −r1(A,Z, y1, ...ym).r2(Z, Y, q1, ...qk), φ
If the entity Y has the role r2 in Z with the parameters q1, ...qk in φ, and Z
has the role r1 in A with the parameters y1, ...ym in φ, then Y also has the
role r in A with the parameters x1, ...xn.
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– A.r(h1, ...hn)← C.r1(s1, ...sm) ∩B.r2(l1, ...lk) becomes
r(A, Y, x1, ...xn) : −r1(C, Y, y1, ...ym).r2(B, Y, q1, ...qk), φ
If the entity Y has the role r2 in B with the parameters q1, ...qk in φ, and it
has the role r1 in C with the parameters y1, ...ym in φ, then Y also has the
role r in A with the parameters x1, ...xn.
The enforcement of these statements is done by the RTML PDP as previously
explained.
5 Example
Credentials held by the entity Alice
1. KStateU.Student(university =′ StateU ′, department =′ CS′, id =′ 22530k′, firstname =′
alice′, lastname =′ smith′)← Alice
2. ACM.AcmMember(number =′ UJ111′, class =′ Professional′, firstname =′
Alice′, lastname =′ smith′)← Alice
3. ABU.University(name =′ StateU ′)← KStateU
Access Rules stored by the entity Epub
1. Epub.University(name =?)⇐ ABU
2. Epub.Student(university = refuni, department =?, program =?, id =?) ⇐
ABU.University(name = refuni)
3. EpubRole1← ACM.AcmMember(number =?, class =?, firstname = reffirst, lastname =
reflast)∩Epub.Student(university =?, department = CS, id =?, firstname =
reffirst, lastname = reflast)
4. EpubRole0← Epub.Student(university =?, department = CS, id =?, firstname =
?, lastname =?)
In that wording the symbol ’?’ is used to indicate a parameter whose value is
not specified and φ is a congiuntion of constraints as explained in [21]. Alice
represents the DN of the principal specified in the first two credentials for the
roles issued by the entities whose DN are KStateU and ACM. While, in the third
credential, the principal is KStateU and not Alice, this statement could be used
to infer information about Alice’s roles.
The output of the RT Engine is the following set of DATALOG statements:
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1. Student(KStateU,Alice, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) : −x1 =′ StateU ′, x2 =′ CS′, x3 =′
22530k′, x4 =′ alice′, x5 =′ smith′.
2. AcmMember(ACM,Alice, x1, x2, x3, x4) : −x1 =′ alice′, x2 =′ smith′, x3 =′
Professional′, x4 =′ UJ111′.
3. University(ABU,KStateU, x1) : −x1 =′ StateU ′.
4. Student(Epub, Y, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) : −
University(′Epub′, X, y1), y1 = uniname, Student(X,Y, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5), x1 =
uniname.
5. University(Epub, Y, x1) : −University(ABU, Y, x1).
6. EpubRole1(Epub, Y ) : −
AcmMember(ACM,Y, x1, x2, x3, x4), x3 = namefirst, x4 = namelast,
Student(Epub, Y, y1, y2, y3, y4, y5), y4 = namefirst, y5 = namelast.
7. EpubRole0(Epub, Y ) : −
Student(Epub, Y, y1, y2, y3, y4, y5).
EpubRole0 and EpubRole1 grant access to services as expressed in the follow-
ing configuration file used by the PDP:
<TargetAccessPolicy_DOMAINS>
<TargetDomainSpec ID="TargetDomain1">
<Include URL="http://localhost/wsrf/services/secured">
<Include URL="https://localhost/wsrf/services/secured"/>
</TargetDomainSpec>
<TargetDomainSpec ID="TargetDomain2">
<Include URL="http://localhost/wsrf/services/ManagedJobFactoryService"/>
<Include URL="https://localhost/wsrf/services/ManagedJobFactoryService"/>
</TargetDomainSpec>
<TargetAccessPolicy>
<TargetAccess>
<RoleList>
<Role Value="EpubRole0" AccessLevel=1/>
<Role Value="EpubRole1" AccessLevel=3/>
</RoleList>
<TargetList>
<Target Action="createManagedJob">
<TargetDomain ID="TargetDomain2"/>
</Target>
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</TargetList>
</TargetAccess>
<TargetAccess>
<RoleList>
<Role Value="Role0"/>
</RoleList>
<TargetList>
<Target Action="">
<TargetDomain ID="TargetDomain1"/>
</Target>
</TargetList>
</TargetAccess>
</TargetAccessPolicy>
</TargetAccessPolicy_DOMAINS>
If Alice asks for ManagedJobFactoryService which belongs to the Target-
Domain2 she needs to use EpubRole0 or EpubRole1, the attribute AccessLevel
indicates the trust level of the role in the system.
The Prolog Engine will use these statements to perform the evaluation of the
goals:
1. ? : −EpubRole0(Epub,Alice).
2. ? : −EpubRole1(Epub,Alice).
in order to determine the roles that Alice can access. Alice has the access to
ManagedJobFactoryService granted by his credentials by both the roles and she
can choose the one to use in the JobConfigurationFile (the default is the role
with the lowest AccessLevel value). If the second credential has not been owned
by Alice the second goal will not be enforced and she can only access the service
with EpubRole0. When a role is granted to a user executing a job, the service
provider will grant not only the specific credential for that role but also all
the credentials in which the body identifies the service provider entity or, at
least, the role granted to the user in the site, e.g. the credentials issued by
Alice granted her the right to enjoy a service provided by Epub with the role
of EpubRole0, if the job will be performed successfully, Epub will grant her the
credential Epub.Reader()← Alice and all the others with these forms:
B.R()← EPub.
B.R()← Epub.EpubRole0().
for any entity B and any role R.
6 Conclusions and future work
This paper proposed a flexible and powerful instrument for service and resource
management which enables each site to dynamically evaluating user’s requests
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exploiting his credentials. At this time we experimented the RTML only for user
authorization and once the requested job is in execution, any other restriction is
provided then the one due to the use of the Unix account paired with the role. It
could be desiderable to have more control on the execution. A future goal could
be an implementation in which a role also determines a security policy that is
enforced during the execution of the application.
In our framework when a user successfully performs a job using a specific
role, he receives a credential certificating that and it can be used to ask the
execution of other jobs on other service.
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